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Marco Di Stefano 
Young v. UPS and the Evidentiary Dilemma 
 
 The Fourth Circuit in Young v. UPS and Sixth Circuit in Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon have 
split on the question of whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter PDA) includes an 
obligation to accommodate a pregnant employee’s work restrictions when an employer does so for 
non-pregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work. The Sixth Circuit, in Ensley-
Gaines v. Runyon, held that pregnant employees need not be similarly situated in all relevant 
respects but the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or her ability or inability to 
work.1 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit held that the non-occupational source of the plaintiff’s 
lifting restriction was sufficient to defeat any similarities between a pregnant employee and the 
workers that the policy granted an accommodation to. Thus, requiring a higher degree of similarity 
than the Sixth Circuit. 2 
  In Young v. UPS, the Supreme Court has addressed the split by channeling claims brought 
under the PDA through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test.3  Once the plaintiff has 
established her prima facie case via McDonnell Douglas an employer has the burden of production 
to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying the accommodation.4  Once the 
employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must establish that the 
employer's reason is pretextual.5 
 Although the Court has addressed the split, there are many questions left open for lower 
courts concerning pretext and comparators. This lack of clarity will lead to subjective decision 
making by lower courts and inconsistent results. Because of the lack of clarity, there is a risk lower 
                                                        
1 Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1996). 
2 Young v. UPS, 784 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2013). 
3 Young v. UPS, 135 S.Ct 1338, 1354 (2015). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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courts will continue to interpret the PDA in a narrow way requiring the non-pregnant comparators 
to be similar to the pregnant employees in all-relevant respects. Furthermore, forcing pregnant 
employees to prove their PDA claim through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach 
creates an evidentiary quagmire for pregnant employees that will have difficulty finding 
sufficiently similar comparators to prove their claims due to the high degree of similarity required 
by courts.  
 This comment argues that a new legislative solution should be implemented consistent with 
the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (hereinafter the PWFA), which creates an affirmative duty to 
accommodate pregnant women unless the accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer. This resolves any ambiguity left open by the majority in Young because the PWFA 
would streamline the proof requirements for pregnant workers denied these accommodations by 
ensuring that a worker with a limitation arising out of pregnancy did not have to identify a non-
pregnant comparator in any particular case who had already received the reasonable 
accommodation sought.  
 Part one of this comment will explain the PDA’s two clauses and the congressional history 
that suggests lower courts should take a broad interpretation of the second clause of the PDA. Part 
two will summarize the Circuit split that lead to the Supreme Court granting certiorari to Peggy 
Young. Part three will explain the majority opinion by Justice Breyer and Justice Alito’s 
Concurrence. Part four will summarize the subsequent decisions that have been decided since 
Young v. UPS and how they serve as an analogy for the types of risks that pregnant workers face 
given the Supreme Court’s ambiguous standard. Part five will identify the ambiguities in the 
Supreme Court’s decision and the problem that pregnant women will have finding evidence to 
prove their claims under the PDA. Part six will discuss the PWFA, which resolves the ambiguities 
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by alleviating the pregnant employees burden of comparing workers. Part six will also discuss the 
effect the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 will have on the Supreme 
Court’s test. 
I. Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
 Both clauses of the PDA are necessary to keep employers from discriminating against their 
employees based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions. The first clause of the PDA alters 
the definition of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by making the 
“terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.”6 The first clause is a definition without any additional substantive protections. Thus, 
all the first clause does is further define the protective class that may bring suit under Title VII. 
The second clause of the PDA provides a distinct and independent substantive standard, which 
employers must satisfy. This clause states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including 
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”7 This second clause of the PDA requires an employer to treat 
pregnant employees the same as other employees with limitations similar to those of the pregnant 
employee.8 The employer need only provide a pregnant employee with an accommodation if said 
accommodation is granted to another “similarly situated” employee.9 In other words, the second 
prong of the PDA does not grant pregnant employees a most favored nation status by requiring all 
pregnant employees be treated more favorably than all other employees because they are 
                                                        
6 42 USCS § 2000e 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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pregnant.10 The second clause of the PDA thus requires formal equality between pregnant and non-
pregnant worker.  
 The PDA’s legislative history suggests that congress intended to provide broad protection 
to women on the basis of pregnancy through the PDA’s legislative history. For example, 
Representative Augustus Hawking introduced the act on the floor of the House, emphasizing that 
the purpose of the act was to broadly ban discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.11 Hawkins 
acknowledged that “because many of the disadvantages imposed on women are predicated upon 
their capacity to become pregnant, genuine equality in the American labor force is no more than 
an illusion as long as employers remain free to make pregnancy the basis of the unfavorable 
treatment of working women.” 12  Testimony in the Senate echoes Representative Hawking’s 
contention that legislators intended that the PDA be broadly interpreted. For example, a Senate 
report supporting the bill stated, “[t]he assumption that women will become pregnant and leave 
the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment 
of women in the workplace.”13  
 In July of 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”)  
issued guidelines proving that courts should read the second clause of the PDA broadly.  The PDA 
provided that “[a]n employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the same as other 
employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by relying on a policy that makes 
distinctions based on the source of an employee’s limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty 
                                                        
10 Effland Matthew, Disability Accommodation under the ADA (January 24, 2015) 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-
center/upload/rule18.pdf. 
11 124 Cong. Rec. 21435 (1978), Legis. Hist. at 167-168. 
12 Id. 
13 S. Rep. No. 95-331, p. 3 (1977). 
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only to workers injured on the job).”14 The EEOC guidelines further provided an example of 
disparate treatment that would violate the PDA: 
An employer has a policy or practice of providing light duty, subject to availability, 
for any employee who cannot perform one or more job duties for up to 90 days due 
to injury, illness, or a condition that would be a disability under the ADA. An 
employee requests a light duty assignment for a 20-pound lifting restriction related 
to her pregnancy. The employer denies the light duty request.15 
 
The EEOC further added “an employer may not deny light duty to a pregnant employee based on a 
policy that limits light duty to employees with on-the-job injuries.”16 Thus, evidence from both the 
PDA’s legislative history and the subsequent EEOC guidelines show that courts should interpret 
the second clause of the PDA broadly to achieve its legislative goals of eradicating pregnancy 
discrimination. However, not all courts interpret the PDA broadly for fear that a broad interpretation 
would give pregnant employees a privileged status over non-pregnant employees.17 The contrasting 
interpretation of the circuits has led to a circuit split as will be discussed in the sections below.   
II. Circuit Split 
 
a. Fourth Circuit interpretation of the PDA 
 In Young v. UPS the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit inquired whether the 
PDA required employers to provide light duty accommodation for pregnant employees when they 
provide such accommodations for non-pregnant employees. The plaintiff, Peggy Young was a part 
time driver for UPS. She became pregnant in 2006 and was given lifting restrictions by her 
doctor.18 Young was advised that she “should not lift more than twenty pounds during the first 
                                                        
14 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626-I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014). 
15 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626-I(A)(5), p. 626:0013, Example 10. 
16 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §626-I(A)(5), p. 626:0028. 
17 McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Iowa 2015) (“the Court found nothing from the history and 
background of the Act to suggest Congress intended for the PDA to alter the approach of the law or to impose a 
‘new legislative mandate’ to require more favorable treatment for pregnant employees.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-
948, at 3-4 (1978)) 
18 Young v. UPS, 784 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2013).  
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twenty weeks of her pregnancy or more than ten pounds thereafter.”19 Drivers from UPS, however, 
are required to lift parcels weighing up to seventy pounds or more.20 UPS had a policy where the 
company would accommodate lifting restrictions. 21  For an employee to be granted an 
accommodation under the policy, however, she would need to qualify for temporary alternative 
work assignment. 22  The policy made temporary alternative work assignments available to 
employees that suffered on-the-job injuries, suffered from permanent disability or have lost his or 
her Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) certification because of a medical 
examination.23 Because Young’s pregnancy fit into none of the categories listed in UPS’s policy, 
UPS prohibited her from working while under the work restrictions.24 
 In July 2007, Young filed a pregnancy discrimination charge with the EEOC.25 After 
receiving a right to sue letter,26 she brought an individual disparate treatment claim against UPS 
in federal district court alleging a violation of the PDA.27 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of UPS because Ms. Young could not show intentional discrimination via direct 
evidence and she could not satisfy her burden under McDonnell Douglas test.28 She subsequently 
appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit.  
                                                        
19 Id. 
20 Young, 784 F.3d at 196. 
21 Young, 784 F.3d at 195. 
22 Id.  
23 Young, F.3d at 196. 
24 Id.  
25 Young, 784 F.3d at 197. 
26 Karstens v. International Gamco, Inc., 939 F.Supp. 1430 (D.Neb. 1996) (“Timely filing a charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC is a prerequisite to the later commencement of a civil action in federal court. The purpose of filing 
the charge is to provide the EEOC with an opportunity to investigate and attempt to resolve the controversy through 
conciliation before permitting the aggrieved party to pursue a lawsuit.  To exhaust her remedies, not only must a 
Title VII plaintiff timely file her charges with the EEOC, but she must also receive a "right to sue" letter from the 
EEOC.”) 
27 Young, 784 F.3d at 97. 
28 Id. 
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 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Young’s interpretation of “similar in their ability or 
inability to work” clause of the PDA.29 The non-occupational source of Young’s lifting restriction 
was sufficient to defeat any similarities between her and the workers that the policy granted an 
accommodation to.30 The Fourth Circuit refused to require UPS to accommodate pregnant workers 
because such a requirement would result in preferential treatment for pregnant workers. 31 
According to the Fourth Circuit, giving pregnant workers such an accommodation would not be 
fair to workers that were injured in the workplace.32 The policy that UPS had in place would 
exclude many workers injured off the job.33 If UPS was required to provide pregnant workers with 
accommodations, then these pregnant workers would receive access to the accommodation while 
non-pregnant employees with off-the-job physical limitations would not.34 The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the PDA merely requires that employers implement neutral, pregnancy-blind 
policies and that UPS does not need to provide preferential access to light duty work for pregnant 
employees with non-occupational pregnancy restrictions where it would not do the same for non-
pregnant employees with non-occupational injuries.35 The Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
largely agreed with the Fourth Circuit, though no circuit has gone so far as to hold that employers 
accommodating other employees need not accommodate pregnant workers.36 
b. Sixth Circuit Interpretation of the PDA 
                                                        
29 Young, 784 F.3d at 205. 
30 Young, 784 F.3d at 203. 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 
F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. 
Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1998) (“By defining sex discrimination under Title VII to 
include pregnancy, Congress intended to do no more than ‘re-establish principles of Title VII law as they had been 
understood prior to the Gilbert decision,’ and ensure that female workers would not be treated ‘differently from 
other employees simply because of their capacity to bear children.’”). 
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 In Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same 
question regarding the second clause of the PDA that the Fourth Circuit Court addressed. The 
plaintiff in Ensley-Gaines was a mail handler working full time. 37  There was a collective 
bargaining agreement38 between the Postal Service and the National Postal Mail handlers Union. 
Under this agreement, workers who were temporarily unable to work may submit written requests 
for alternative assignments.39 The Postal Service’s plan distinguishes between limited duty and 
light duty. Limited duty is available to those workers injured on the job, while light duty is 
available to employees whom have sustained injuries that are not employment related.40 On July 
3, 1991, the plaintiff requested temporary light duty status under the agreement because of the 
medical limitations her doctor imposed on her due to her pregnancy, which include a fifteen pound 
lifting limitation and a four hour limit on standing and sitting.41 She was not permitted to sit while 
working after four hours of working while standing.42 She like, Peggy Young, filed a pregnancy 
discrimination charge with the EEOC.43  After receiving a right-to-sue letter, she brought an 
individual disparate treatment claim against UPS in federal district court alleging a violation of the 
PDA.44 
 The Sixth Circuit found that the “the burden under PDA differed from other Title VII cases 
in that plaintiff need not show that those receiving favorable treatment were similar in all respects, 
                                                        
37 Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1996). 
38 Collective Bargaining, Legal Dictionary, http://legaldictionary.net/collective-bargaining/ (“Collective bargaining 
is the negotiation process that takes place between an employer and a group of employees when certain issues arise. 
The employees rely on a union member to represent them during the bargaining process, and the negotiations often 
relate to regulating such issues as working conditions, employee safety, training, wages, and layoffs. When an 
agreement is reached, the resulting ‘collective bargaining agreement,’ or ‘CBA,’ becomes the contract governing 
employment issues.”) 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Einsley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1223. 
43 Einsley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1221. 
44 Id.  
 10 
but merely in their ability or inability to work.”45 The Sixth Circuit rejected a rule from Mitchell 
v. Toledo Hospital, which stated that  
. . . the individual with whom the pregnant employee seeks to compare her treatment 
must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards 
and engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating circumstances that 
would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them of it.46 
 
The Sixth Circuit further found that the Plaintiff successfully demonstrated that the contention that 
they were unequally situated was pretextual.47 The defendant had articulated a facially legitimate 
reason for its treatment of the plaintiff, namely that any disparate treatment arose from the 
distinction between limited- duty employees and light-duty employees.48 She presented evidence 
that “limited-duty and light-duty employees are similarly situated and differ only with respect to 
the fact that limited-duty employees are unable to perform their full duties because they have been 
injured on the job and light-duty employees are unable to perform their full duties because of a 
non-job-related injury or illness”. 49  While the employer must continue to pay limited-duty 
employees regardless of whether they work, this distinction is inconsequential to the court because 
the distinction pertains to the terms of employment, not to an employee's ability or inability to 
work, as provided in the PDA. The sixth circuit, thus, did not require that plaintiff be similar to the 
comparators in all-relevant respects but only similar in their ability or inability to work. As such, 
the Sixth Circuit has adopted a much broader interpretation of the second prong of the PDA when 
compared to the Fourth Circuit.50 The Eight and Tenth Circuits agreed with the Sixth Circuit by 
holding that with regard to the similarly situated analysis, a pregnant employee should be 
                                                        
45 Id. 
46 Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992). 
47 Id. at 1226. 
48 Ensley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1224-25. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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compared to any other employee who has a similar ability or inability to perform the job, including 
those who become temporarily disabled due to a workplace injury incurred while on the job.51 
III. Supreme Court’s Resolution of this Circuit Split 
a. How the Supreme Court Majority Split the Baby 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion focused on interpreting the second clause of the PDA 
because that was the focal point of the dispute between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, as well as 
the focal point of the disagreement of the parties.52 Peggy Young argued that the clause “requires 
an employer to provide the same accommodation to workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy 
that it provides to workplace disabilities that have other causes but have similar effect on ability 
to work.”53 The Court rejected this argument because the PDA would then grant pregnant women 
a “most favored employee” status.54 This means that if the employer provided an employee with 
an accommodation, then the employer must give such an accommodation to all pregnant 
employees.55 According to the Court, such an interpretation would not allow for the appropriate 
balancing of the distinguishing factors of employee’s jobs such as the employer’s need for certain 
employee’s to keep working, and the employee’s age.56 The language in the statute does not 
require employers to treat pregnant employees the same as any other person.  
 UPS argued that the PDA’s second clause merely clarifies the first clause by defining sex 
discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination, and does not impose any additional 
                                                        
51 See Adams v. Nolan, 962 F2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding that the plaintiff demonstrated that some officers 
with off the job injuries or conditions other than pregnancy in fact were given light duty assignments to 
accommodate their condition); see also EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc, 956 F2d 944, 948 (10th Cir. 
1992) (holding that the “clear language of the PDA requires the court to compare treatment between pregnant 
persons and ‘other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work’”). 
52 Young v. UPS, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015). 
53 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1349. 
54 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1362. 
55 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1349-59. 
56 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1349-50. 
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requirements on employers.57 The Court rejected UPS’s argument because such a reading would 
render the second clause of the statute superfluous.58 Such a reading is superfluous because the 
first clause of the PDA already expressly amends Title VII definitional provision to clarify that 
pregnancy discrimination counts as sex discrimination.59 To accept such an interpretation would 
be inconsistent with the legislative intent to overrule General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.60  The 
Supreme Court in Gilbert held that employers could treat pregnancy differently from other 
illnesses or disabilities as long as it did so on a neutral basis. 61 Both clauses are needed to overturn 
Gilbert because the first clause of the PDA reflected congressional disapproval of the decision and 
the second clause demonstrated how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied. Thus, to 
read the second clause in such a way that would render it meaningless would defeat such a 
legislative intent.62 
 The majority instead held that a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation 
constituted disparate treatment under the PDA’s second clause may establish a prima facie case of 
pregnancy discrimination either through direct or circumstantial evidence. A plaintiff may 
establish a prima facie case of pregnancy through “direct evidence that a workplace policy, 
practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic. . . .” If a plaintiff does not have 
direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, then the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case 
through circumstantial evidence, as in McDonnell Douglas, that she belongs to the protected class, 
that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her and that the employer 
                                                        
57 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1352. 
58 Id. 
59 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1352. 
60 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1353. 
61 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). 
62 See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guera, 479 U.S. 272, 274 (1987) (“[second clause] was intended 
to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied; the meaning of the first clause is not limited by 
the specific language in the second clause”). 
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did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”63 The employer may then 
seek to justify its different treatment of pregnant employees by relying on legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for refusing to accommodate a pregnant employee.64 What is a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason? The majority in Young states that the reason normally cannot consist 
simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to their 
current accommodation plan.65 
 If an employer offers an apparently legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions, 
the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual.66 A 
plaintiff may survive a summary judgment motion and reach a jury on this issue by providing 
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant 
employees and that the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons are not sufficiently 
strong to justify the burden.67 The majority further stated that the plaintiff could create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the 
employer accommodates a large percentage of non-pregnant employees while at the same time 
failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant employees.68 
b. Justice Alito’s Answer the Unanswered Questions About Pretext? 
Justice Alito authored the concurring opinion where he tried to elaborate on the ambiguities 
left unresolved in the majority’s new test. He grappled with the question of to whom must the 
pregnant employees be compared in determining whether they have been given the equal treatment 
that the PDA requires.69 According to Justice Alito, pregnant employees must be compared to 
                                                        
63 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1354. 
64 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1341. 
65 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1338. 
66 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1342-43. 
67 Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1354. 
68 Id.  
69 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1357-58. 
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workers “performing the same or very similar jobs.”70 Another question that this raises is that when 
comparing pregnant and non-pregnant employees in similar jobs, “which characteristics of the 
pregnant and non-pregnant employees must be taken into account.71 Justice Alito answered this 
question by referencing “other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work.” The 
phrase “similar in their ability or inability to work” simply means “similar in relation to the ability 
or inability to work.”72 Under such an interpretation, pregnant and non-pregnant workers are not 
similar in relation to their ability or inability to work if the reasons for their inability to work are 
different.73 Pregnant and non-pregnant employees thus, are not similar in the relevant sense if the 
employer has a neutral business reasons for treating them differently. 74 
What is such a neutral business reason? Justice Alito echoes the majority opinion in 
declaring what the reason cannot be that accommodating is more expensive or less convenient.75 
Furthermore, he gives two further illustrations by applying his variation of the test to Young’s 
claim.76 The respondent, UPS, had a neutral business reason for accommodating non-pregnant 
employees when it was required to do so by the ADA.77 UPS also had a neutral business reason 
for accommodating the non-pregnant workers off the job. 78  If these employees were not 
accommodated, then UPS would have had to provide them with workers compensation benefits.79 
However, there are no neutral business reasons for accommodating workers that lost their DOT 
certification.80 These workers could have lost their certification based on medical injuries or 
                                                        
70 Id.  
71 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1359. 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1359. 
75 Id. 
76 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1360. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1360. 
80 Id. 
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limitations incurred off the job.81 Pregnant employees too have medical limitations incurred off 
the job.82 Pregnancy stands in the way of pregnant employees and their work just like the loss of 
a DOT certification stands in the way of non-pregnant employees.83 Yet these non-pregnant drivers 
are given light duty work assignments that are compatible with their limitations and pregnant 
employees are not. 84 
III. Lower Court PDA Decisions After Young 
 
a. Antonich v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n 
In Antonich v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, a Minnesota District Court also considered 
a claim brought under the PDA and applied the Supreme Court’s burden-shifting framework from 
Young. The plaintiff, Antonich, worked as a bank teller for U.S. Bank.85 She took an eight-week 
parenting leave of absence in April 2011 after the birth of her first child.86 After the parenting 
leave, she resigned to complete an associate’s degree and was rehired at another branch in August 
of 2012.87 U.S. Bank maintains certain check and cashing policies for checks.88 Defendant trained 
Antonich in these procedures when she was first hired.89 Any mistakes in these procedures would 
jeopardize her employment at U.S. Bank.90 Antonich became pregnant with her second child while 
working at the U.S. Bank and informed both her immediate manager and the branch manager that 
she would be taking a parenting leave, which would have begun on May 27, 2013.91 While working 
                                                        
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Young, 135 S.Ct at 1360. 
85 Antonich v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106565, *1-2 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2015). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Antonich, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106565 at *3. 
89 Id at *4. 
90 Id. 
91 Id at *27.  
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on February 2013, she processed a fraudulent check causing U.S. Bank substantial losses.92 In 
processing the fraudulent checks, she failed to follow the policies. 93  U.S. Bank terminated 
Antonich’s employment on May 24, 2013 and Antonich was not rehired for another position.94 
Plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII, as amended by the pregnancy discrimination act for her 
termination. The court ultimately granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.95 
 The district court concluded that the employee has the burden “to prove that the compared 
employees were similar in all relevant respects.”96 The plaintiff could not demonstrate pretext 
because there were no other employees who were identified as having committed a policy violation 
resulting in a loss of more than $1,000 or more who were still employed with US Bank.97 There 
were employees who incurred more than a $1,000 loss but the cause of the loss was a teller 
variation and not a policy violation.98 Also, there were tellers that created a risk of loss of more 
than $1,000 but there was no actual loss incurred by the bank so those employees remained 
employed.99  
b. Emmanuel v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. 
 In Emmanuel v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., the plaintiff, Emmanuel Cushman filed a PDA 
claim in the Southern District of New York. Emmanuel worked for Cushman as a receptionist.100 
Nancy Lara was the senior property manager for Cushman.101 Charlene Coger was a supervisor 
and managed the receptionists.102 Lara would consult Coger before taking any disciplinary action 
                                                        
92 Id at *5-6. 
93 Id at *9. 
94 Id at *11. 
95 Id at *16. 
96 Id at *45. 
97 Id at *46.  
98 Id at *46-48. 
99 Id at *48. 
100 Emmanuel v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113280, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015). 
101 Id  at *1-3. 
102Id at *3. 
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against the receptionist.103 Coger did not have any individual authority to either hire, fire, adjust 
employee grievances or issue a written discipline.104 On October 2011, Emanuel informed Coger 
that she was pregnant. 105  Coger asked Emanuel if she would terminate her pregnancy and 
Emmanuel responded that she did not intend to.106 Coger responded to her comment “watch your 
back or watch yourself in here.” 107  On March of 2012, an unidentified scholastic employee 
reported that Emanuel was sleeping on the couch in a reception area during business hours.108 The 
employee reported to Coger whom reported to Lara. 109  Lara then terminated Emanuel’s 
employment with Cushman.110  
 Emanuel asserted claims under Title VII, as amended by the PDA for her termination. 111 
The court ultimately granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.112  Because there was no 
evidence that Coger consulted with Lara or otherwise played a role in connection with the specific 
decision to terminate Emmanuel's employment, the evidence suggesting that Coger was biased 
against pregnant employees does not indicate that Emmanuel's pregnancy was a motivating factor 
in Lara's decision to terminate her employment.113 Furthermore, Coger’s failure to discipline two 
other non-pregnant employees for sleeping in the reception area is not probative of pretext because 
Coger was not involved in the decision to terminate Emmanuel's employment.114 The comparators 
                                                        
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Id at *4. 
106 Id at *4 
107 Id.  
108 Id at *6. 
109 Id. 
110 Id at *7. 
111 Id at *1.  
112 Id at *28-29. 
113 Id at *16-17 
114 Id at *19 
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were not similarly situated because the decision maker that fired Emmanuel was not the same 
decision maker that treated the two other non-pregnant employees more favorably.115 
V. Problems with the Supreme Court’s Resolution 
a. Unanswered Questions 
 The Supreme Court’s use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test left many 
questions unanswered. For example, what justifications for denying pregnant women 
accommodations will constitute “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons”? An employer’s 
obligations under the PDA are unclear in that the only guidance that the Supreme Court gave to 
what a legitimate non-discriminatory reason is what it cannot be, i.e. more expensive or less 
convenient for the employer.116 If the majority provided an affirmative, non-exhaustive list of 
things that could constitute such a reason that would provide more guidance to lower courts in 
addressing this ambiguity.     
 Furthermore, the ultimate decision of liability will turn on whether a fact finder places 
greater value on the burden on pregnant workers or on the employer’s justification for not 
accommodating the employee. 117  What evidence suffices for an employee to show that the 
employer’s justification is not sufficiently strong? The majority originally stated that plaintiffs like 
Peggy Young could prove that the employer’s reasons for not accommodating pregnant employees 
were not sufficiently strong by providing evidence that employers had multiple policies 
accommodated certain non-pregnant workers.118 However, the Court then goes on to state it will 
not consider whether UPS’s reasons for not accommodating Peggy Young are sufficiently strong 
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and will remand the decision to the lower court to decide. 119  This directly contradicts the 
majority’s earlier statement about the way plaintiffs like Peggy Young could prove their 
employer’s reasons were not sufficiently strong by saying they are not addressing this question. 
Furthermore, lower courts will be confused in applying this part of the test because they will not 
know how much weight to give to the court’s suggestion regarding how plaintiffs could show the 
employer’s reasons for not accommodating pregnant employees were not sufficiently strong, 
 Lastly, the majority does not clearly provide guidance as to what constitutes a significant 
burden. The opinion simply states that “[t]he plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates 
a large percentage of non-pregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large number of 
pregnant workers.”120 The court did not fully explain what constitutes a large percentage and left 
the lower court discretion to make its own subjective interpretations as to what constitutes a large 
percentage. Such an ambiguous standard does not provide any guidance to lower courts and will 
lead to inconsistency by lower courts in determining whether the percentage is large enough to tip 
the scales in the pregnant employees favor.  Although relying on statistical disparities is not the 
only way that the plaintiff can establish a genuine question of material fact about the employer's 
proffered reason for denying her requested accommodation121 , lower courts will rely on the 
Supreme Courts ambiguous standard where plaintiff’s try to establish their claims by relying on 
statistical disparities.  
b. Justice Alito Furthers the Comparator Ambiguity  
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 Justice Alito’s concurring opinion does not answer the question left open by the majority 
regarding comparators but rather furthers the confusion. Justice Alito does not really define what 
generally neutral business reason. It is not similar to what the ADA defines as an “undue hardship” 
because he asserts how different the language in the PDA’s second clause is from other anti-
discrimination provisions. Justice Alito gives a negative definition of genuine neutral business 
reason in defining what it cannot be, i.e. too expensive and less convenient. He also only provides 
a limited number of illustrations by applying his standard to Young’s case. The concurrence’s new 
“genuine neutral business reason” standard invites judicial subjectivity on the part of lower courts 
just like the majority did and provides just as little guidance as the majority. 
 Justice Alito’s concurring opinion exploits the ambiguities in the majority’s opinion and 
made it harder for pregnant employees to find proof of comparators. His interpretation as to what 
the relevant comparators has allowed employers to avoid addressing the ongoing and pervasive 
problem of pregnancy discrimination because he has broadened the category of characteristics 
employers may take into account. An employer may find dissimilarity on the basis of traits other 
than ability to work so long as there is a neutral business reason for considering those traits. Thus, 
Justice Alito’s interpretation of the second clause of the PDA give employers more latitude for 
avoiding compliance with the PDA than necessary by allowing employers to discriminate based 
on pregnancy so long as they had a genuine neutral business reason for doing so.  
c. The Evidentiary Conundrum 
 The Young decision also creates an evidentiary conundrum because direct evidence of 
discrimination can be difficult to obtain. Direct evidence is evidence that is so one sided that no 
inference from the jury is required.122 Essentially, this means that the employer admitted to acting 
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with discriminatory intent.123 Because direct evidence is scarce, most women will need to prove 
their case via the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Pregnant workers are expected to 
produce enough evidence to prove their prima-facie case but must do so in circumstances where 
there is often no official policy or where the employer has obscured the policy for purposes of 
avoiding liability.   
 The comparator may enter the analysis at the prima facie case stage or to show pretext by 
establishing that the employer did not apply its non-discriminatory reason in a sex-blind manner.124 
Antonich v. United States demonstrates the difficulty that employees face in finding sufficient 
evidence of comparators to show pretext.  Courts will be less likely to grant summary judgment in 
favor of employees in cases where the employee, although unable to show pretext, has sufficiently 
strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination that might lead a jury to find that the employment 
decision was motivated, at least in part, by discrimination.125 In Antonich, the court established 
that a plaintiff had the burden to show that “U.S. Bank treated her differently than other non-
pregnant employees.”126 A plaintiff must show that “the compared employees were similarly 
situated in all relevant respects.”127 Pregnant workers in the accommodation context will face 
similar hardships in finding sufficiently similar comparators to pregnant employees in the 
termination context if lower courts interpret the second clause of the PDA to require the non-
pregnant comparators to be similar in all relevant respects. Given the ambiguities in both the 
majority’s and the concurrence’s pretext analysis that remains a possibility that is all too stark for 
pregnant employees.  
                                                        
123 Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d  413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996). 
124 See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 59 Ala. 
L. Rev. 191 (2009). 
125Smith, 76 F.3d  at *22. 
126 Antonich, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106565 at *45.  
127 Id. 
 22 
 The reason why Antonich’s claim failed was due to the court’s narrow interpretation of 
similarly situated.128 The majority required that similarly situated employees, or “comparators,” 
deal “with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same 
conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.”129 To be suggestive of pretext, 
evidence of the alleged misconduct of other employees must be of “comparable seriousness.”130 
However, pregnant employees face a Herculean challenge to find evidence of non-pregnant 
workers that committed an offense of comparable seriousness that were treated more favorably. 
Antonich, like other pregnant employees in her position, failed to meet this evidentiary burden 
because it requires such a high degree of similarity.131 Antonich failed in discovery to elicit the 
requisite information due to a failed interrogatory that included too many higher-level employees 
in the field of comparators.132 
 Emmanuel v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. also demonstrates the difficulty that workers in 
general face, let alone pregnant workers, to find sufficient evidence to establish that their 
employer’s rationale is merely pretextual. Even though Emmanuel is a termination case, a plaintiff 
that brings an accommodation claim under the PDA will face similar hardships in establishing that 
the person that failed to grant them an accommodation was the actual decision maker. The plaintiff, 
in Emanuel, did not establish that the same decision maker that discriminatorily fired her was the 
same decision maker that failed to discipline the other two non-pregnant employees that also fell 
asleep in the reception area.133 Because the plaintiff did not establish that the same decision maker 
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disciplined her that disciplined the two other employees, then she could not show pretext.134 It is 
commonplace that there are many levels of management and the employee may be dealing with 
several managers all of whom have varying degree of power over her.135 For this reason a decision 
to fire or failure to accommodate may come from a number of managers and it is difficult to prove 
which one actually terminated the plaintiff or denied her the accommodation. It is similarly 
difficult to prove that the person that made the employment decisions possessed the authority to 
make determinations about the pregnant employee's employment or had influence over the formal 
decision maker. 
 Even though both Antonich and Emmanuel are about termination and not accommodation 
they serve as a good analogy of the types of hardships that pregnant workers have in establishing 
their pregnancy discrimination claims. Both in the termination context and the accommodation 
context pregnant employees can establish pretext by finding sufficiently similar comparators. 
Because justice Alito in his concurrence has broadened the characteristic that employers may take 
into account and has added that employers may find dissimilarity on the basis of traits other than 
ability to work, pregnant workers will have just as hard a time find sufficiently similar non-
pregnant employees. Requiring pregnant employees to find other workers that nearly identical to 
them is a nearly impossible standard for them to meet due to their condition. The circuits will 
likely continue to have differing interpretations of the degree of similarity between pregnant and 
non-pregnant employees because of the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity in Young. Providing 
pregnant workers with accommodations would impose such a de minimis burden on employers 
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that pregnant workers should not be required to have to identify non-pregnant comparators, as was 
the case in Young.136  
VI. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act: A Statutory Solution to The Young Evidentiary Quagmire 
 
a.Understanding the Statute 
 The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (hereinafter the PWFA) was a bill that had been 
introduced in Congress three times but now has bipartisan support. When it was initially introduced 
in 2012, the PWFA (which has not yet passed) was drafted to respond to the improper narrowing 
and misreading of the PDA by some lower courts.137  Under the previous PDA scheme, pregnant 
workers had no clear path to accommodation and employers had no clear understanding of their 
responsibilities. It is time for a new statutory solution to the ambiguities created by both the PDA 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. UPS. The PWFA uses the same language as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and twenty-five years of ADA court decisions give clear 
guidance to lower courts as to what the law is.138 Employers know just what to expect, and, most 
importantly, pregnant women know they will be protected. 
 This bill would answer questions left open by the Supreme Court by setting out a simple, 
easy-to-apply legal standard that provides clarity to employers and employees. The new statute 
would prohibit employers from failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for limitations that 
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arise out of pregnancy, childbirth, or any other related medical conditions.139 The PWFA requires 
employers to make the same sorts of accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth and related 
medical conditions that the ADA requires employers make for disabilities.140 Under the ADA, 
“reasonable accommodations may include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, [. . .] and other similar accommodations. . . .”141 Thus, such 
accommodations would probably be required of employers under the PWFA because the PWFA 
is modeled after the ADA and it is required under the ADA.   
 The exception would be an accommodation that causes an undue hardship for the 
employer. An undue hardship under the PWFA is similar to what it would be under the ADA.142 
“Undue hardship”, according to the ADA, is defined as “significant difficulty or expense incurred 
by a covered entity” with respect to the provision of an accommodation.143  It will probably not be 
the case that providing a pregnant worker with an accommodation will be an undue hardship for 
the employer because pregnant women represent such a small minority in the workforce.144 Only 
about 5% of women in the workforce are pregnant in any given year not all of which will need 
accommodations.145 
 The PWFA would provide further protections than the PDA by making it illegal to avoid 
making accommodations by refusing employment opportunities to pregnant women. 146 
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Furthermore, an employer cannot force a pregnant woman to take leave under any leave law or 
policy if there are other reasonable accommodations that are at the employer’s disposal. 147 
 The PWFA is such a common sense solution that fifteen states, the District of Columbia 
and four cities have passed laws requiring some employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations.148 The evidence from the states and the cities that have state statutes with similar 
provisions to the PWFA is that the clarity that such laws provide helps to reduce lawsuits and helps 
these pregnant women receive the accommodation in a speedier manner than was available under 
the PDA.149 The broad support for accommodating pregnant workers is reflected also in the United 
States Senate whereby all one hundred members of the Senate voted in favor of a budget 
amendment that supported requiring employers to provide reasonable and temporary 
accommodations to pregnant workers if such accommodations are not an undue burden on the 
business entity. 150 
b. How the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Resolve The Young Evidentiary Dilemma? 
 With a statute like the PWFA in place, pregnant employees will not need to undergo the 
nearly impossible task of discovering direct evidence of discrimination in the form of an 
admission.151 Furthermore, pregnant workers will not need to go through the arduous McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting analysis in order to prove their cause of action through circumstantial 
evidence.152 Under the PWFA, pregnant workers would not need to go through the laborious task 
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of discovering sufficient comparators that are similarly situated to prove their cause of action. 153 
Plaintiffs like Peggy Young would be benefited by the PWFA because there is no need for 
plaintiffs like her to find adequate comparators to show pretext.154  
 Because the PWFA requires employers to make the same sorts of accommodations for 
pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions that the ADA requires employers make for 
disabilities, the employers will have ample case law to help them put in place lawful policies. The 
legal analysis under the new legislation would be much simpler than the PDA where a pregnant 
worker’s rights can turn on a determination of whether an employer accommodates a large 
percentage of non-pregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large number of pregnant 
workers.155 Under the PWFA, if you are pregnant, you get an accommodation.156 There are no 
unsurmountable burdens placed against the pregnant employees under the PWFA. Under the 
PWFA, pregnant employees are not required to compare workers or decide what counts as 
discrimination.157 There are no new or confusing terms to trip up the courts.158 Most importantly, 
there are no lengthy, expensive litigation for pregnant employees that cannot afford to go through 
the trials and tribulations of the judicial process.159 The PWFA creates an affirmative duty to 
accommodate pregnant women unless the accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the 
employer.160 The clarity of such a rule would answer all the questions left unanswered by the 
Supreme Court regarding comparators by eliminating them from the discussion all together.161 
c. Americans with Disabilities Act Expansion 
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 There is proposed expansion to the ADA. As the majority has noted, those recent changes 
to the ADA may diminish the practical impact of the Young decision.162 The Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 and subsequent EEOC interpretations have joined forces 
to expand the ADA’s coverage to some temporary disabilities, even when related to healthy 
pregnancies (which are not considered disabilities under the ADA), the accommodation obligation 
of the ADA would render the PDA framework mute.163 The expanded definition make Peggy 
Young’s claim covered not only by the PDA but also the ADA.164 This will ensure that pregnant 
employees get the requisite protection they need because the recent expansion of the law requires 
employers to treat impairments caused by pregnancy, even temporary ones, the same as 
impairments caused by other conditions.165 
VII. Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s Decision in Young v. UPS was an important step toward resolving a 
dispute between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits regarding the meaning of the second prong of the 
PDA by reaffirming the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test as the primary method pregnant 
workers with only circumstantial evidence of discrimination could seek recourse under the statute.  
However, the Supreme Court’s resolution of the dispute between the Fourth and Sixth Circuit 
provided more questions than answers and did not give any guidance to the lower courts regarding 
how many comparators were necessary to show a comparator that is similarly situated to the 
pregnant worker and to what degree must they be similar. The Pregnant Worker Fairness Act 
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resolves all of the loopholes left by the Supreme Court in its decision by dropping the impossible 
hurdle of finding sufficient comparators of similarly situated workers.  
 
 
 
 
  
